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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION [Vol. 1
WAIVER OF INDICTMENT IN TEXAS
T HE unnecessary difficulties in the administration of criminal
justice in Texas which have been occasioned by the require-
ment that all crimes of the grade of felony are to be prosecuted
upon grand-jury indictment, have been recognized for several
decades.1 Perhaps most frequently, criticism has been directed
with regard to the formal requirements and the insistence upon
technicality in the application of statutes governing indictments
rather than with regard to the use of the indictment as a method
of proceeding in felony prosecutions.! While it cannot be said that
1 At a meeting of the District Judges' Association of Texas, held at Austin in
December, 1924, the Committee on Criminal Procedure recommended that the Texas
Constitution and statutes be amended so as to permit the prosecution of felonies by
complaint and information, thus eliminating grand jury indictments except where
deemed necessary by the district judge within his discretion. In supporting this recom-
mendation, Judge J. 0. Woodward of Coleman, Texas, said in part: "I do not favor...
any effort to abolish the grand jury, but I do favor as wise and wholesome, the amend-
ment of Section 10 of Article I of the Bill of Rights and the statutes which follow, so as
to permit the presentation of felonies by complaint and information, leaving the grand
jury to be called when, in the opinion of the district judge, it becomes necessary. This
one amendment would, in my section of the state, permit the trial of felony cases,
ordinarily, at the first term of court after the commisson of the offense, but as we now
await the returning of in indictment by a grand jury, we are confronted ordinarily with
a six months' delay before the case can be called for trial . See Report (1924) 3
TEX. L. REv. 165, 172.
2 ".. . in favour of life great strictnesses have been in all times required in points of
indictments, and the truth is, that it is grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the
law, and the administration thereof; more offenders escape by the over easy ear given
to exceptions in indictments, then by their own innocence, and many times gross mur-
ders, burglaries, robberies, and other heinous and crying offenses, escape by these
unseemly niceties to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the government, and to
the encouragement of villainy, and to the dishonour of God." HALE, HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1st Am. ed. 1847) 193. This statement has been quoted or
referred to by many recent writers. See, e. g., Perkins, Short Indictments and Informa.
tions (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 292.
The degree of certainty usually required is that which will apprise the accused of
the offense charged, enable the court to pronounce judgment on conviction, and enable
the accused to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same
offense. This is further embodied in the statutes. TEx. CONST. (1876) Art. I, § 10; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. (1925) arts. 398, 405.
In its interpretation of the Constitution and statutes, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has seemingly sacrificed justice for formalism on more than one occasion, as
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such criticism has been unwarranted, "' it may be hoped that any
legislative or judicial reconsideration of the problem will not be
limited by the scope of such criticism, but will extend as well to
the question of the necessity of the indictment as a procedural step
in the felony prosecution. Primarily the purpose of this note, how-
ever, is to inquire whether, within the existin' procedure requiring
indictments generally, the ends of criminal justice would be served
by permitting a waiver of the indictment in felony proceedings
under certain circumstances. To ascertain whether the social policy
supporting the grand jury method of proceeding in felony cases is
compatible with a waiver under any circumstances requires a brief
consideration of the early use and purpose of the indictment.
Traditionally, the accusation of any offense of felony grade
has been by preseniment or indictment4 by a grand jury. The in-
indicated l:y a orief glance at several of the frequently cited cases. Thus, prior to the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in the famous "The" case, State v. Campbell, 210
M.). 202, 109 S. W. 706 (1907), where a conviction of rape was reversed because the
indictment failed to conclude "against the peace and dignity of the State," the Texas
Court of Appeals had already reversed convictions for less serious offenses on the same
ground. Thompson v. State, 15 Tex. App. 168 (1883). In Fleming v. State, 62 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 653, 139 S. W. 598 (1911), a conviction of a bank officer for accepting a
deposit "after the bank was insolvent" was reversed because the indictment did not
sufficiently aver that the bank was insolvent at the time the deposit was received. These
technical requirements still dominate the Texas decisions as indicated by the recent
case of Blake v. State, 180 S. W. (2d) 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944), wherein an indict-
ment for theft by the bailee under Texas Penal Code (1925) art. 1429, alleging posses-
sion of cattle in the accused by virtue of a contract of bailment, was held instfficient for
lack of details of the bailment. The notorious decision of the Texas court in Gragg v.
State, 186 S. W. (2d) 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945), in which a conviction for murder
was reversed because the indictment failed to state that the victim was drowned in water,
exemplifies the extreme to which formalism may be extended at the expense of sub-
stantial justice.
An even mere striking recent example of such mediaeval insistence upon formality in
the indictment has received wide and just criticism by the lay pre-s. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, with Justice Graves dissenting, reversed a conviction of murder in the
case of Northern v. State, Tex. Crim. Rep..........S. W. (2d) ....._(decided May 21,
1947) for the reason that the indictment failed to allege that the defendant killed the
victim by kicking and stomping her with his feet.
' See Perkins, Absurdities in Criminal Procedure (1926) 11 IowA L. REv. 297.
4 Today there is no apparent distinction between a presentment and an indictment,
but the latter term is more commonly used to identify all accusations of crime preferred
by a grand jury. Originally, however, the presentment was a charge made by the grand
jury on its own initiative, as distinguished from the indictment which was brought by
the prosecutor and voted a "true bill" by the grand jury. See McClintock, Indictment
By A Grand Jury (1942) 26 MINN. L. REv. 153, 156.
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formation as a means of accusation was relegated to the less serious
crimes classed as misdemeanors.' The grand jury, first used in
England as a device through which information was obtained
from local villagers concerning matters of interest to the Crown,'
was a group of citizens that met occasionally to discuss the actions
of their neighbors with a view to ascertaining those responsible
for crimes committed in their community. However, as early as
the first revolts against the Stuarts, the grand jury had begun to
be used for the purpose of protecting subjects against arbitrary
accusations by the Crown.' As a result of reliance upon the grand
jury procedure in the American colonies for the same purpose, the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was adopted, pro-
viding that "No person shall be held to answer for a[n] ...
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury .... ."' Most of the older states incorporated similar guaran-
tees into their constitutions," but several adopted an alternative
method of proceeding either upon indictment or information in
felony cases.'"
The requirement that felonies be prosecuted by indictment has
been followed in Texas from the time of the outbreak of the revolu-
tion against Mexico. The Consultation held in San Felipe de Austin
in 1835, in Article VII of its "Plans and Powers of a Provisional
' See 4 BL. COMM. *309; 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) §§ 141,
142; see also discussion by Mr. Justice Gray in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885).
The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo.
V, c. 36, § 1 abolished the grand jury in England except in the prosecution of high
treason and certain other offenses triable in the King's Bench Division. The provisions
of this section were made not applicable to indictments for certain offenses found by
grand juries in the county of London and the county of Middlesex.
0 See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 641, 649;
Note (1929) 24 ILL. L. REV. 39, 320.
7 For a discussion of the origin and early use of the indictment in charging criminal
offenses with reference to its present purpose and desirability, see McClintock, Indict.
ment By A Grand Jury (1942) 26 MINN. L. REV. 153.
a U. S. CONST., AMEND. V.
9 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) § 144.
10 Ibid. For an account of some of the modern practices whereby indictments by
grand juries are not deemed necessary in the prosecution of felony offenses, see (1920)
4 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 77.
[Vol. 1
WAIVER OF INDICTMENT
Government," adopted the procedural as well as the substantive
aspects of the common law." The Constitution of 1845 used the
word "indictment;' ' acting under this Constitution, the Legisla-
ture proceeded to simplify the use of .the indictment by abolishing
some of the technicalities which attended its use at common law.'"
It is regrettable that in the codification of the Penal Code and the
Code of Criminal Procedure in 1856, based up, n the work of
Edward Livingston," the archaic connon-law indictment was left
untouched. The codifiers omitted Livingston's numerous and great-
ly simplified forms of indictment for fear that their inclusion
might provoke the Legislature into abandoning the entire project.
It was in this enactment that the indictment was defined and its
requisites were prescribed." This definition has been continued to
the present, and the existing requisites of a valid indictment are
substantially the same as those of the 1856 Code.'"
With the adoption of the "Common Sense Indictment Act" in
1881," Texas advanced a half-century beyond the rest of the Eng-
lish-speaking world, for a time at least. This measure declared
sufficient an indictment which charged an offense in ordinary and
concise language in such a manner as to enable persons of common
understanding to know what was meant. There were also included
in the Act a general form and specific forms for charging the com-
mission of twenty-seven named offenses." These forms were
11 1 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 540.
-'TEX. CONST. (1845) Art. 1, § 8.
13 The Legislature abolished the necessity of using immaterial phrases such as
"force and arms," setting out the value of the instrument causing death, and other
formal requisities. Tex. Laws 1854, c. 49, § 66, 3 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 1502.
14 For an interesting and informative discussion of the part that Edward Livingston
played in the creation of the codes and their adoption in Texas, see Wilkinson, Edward
Livingston and the Penal Codes (1922) 1 TF.X. L. REv. 25.
15 TEX. CODE CIUM. PROC. (1857) arts. 394-399.
16 TEX. CODE CraM. PRoc. (1925) art. 396.
17 9 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 152. These annear in the nreent Cndp nf Crim-
inal Procedure (1925) as articles 405-12.
is Id., § 11.
1947]
TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
couched in very broad terms, e. g., the charge for burglary being
"A. B. did break and enter the dwelling house of C. D., with intent
to steal."'" No provision was made for a bill of particulars, but it
was necessary that all the facts constituting the offense as defined
by law should be proved.2" The Act went further in some respects
than even the modern Code of Criminal Procedure adopted by the
American Law Institute in 1930.1 It has often erroneously been
stated that the Act was held unconstitutional; actually its general
form has been upheld, and only five forms for specific crimes have
been held insufficient to meet the constitutional requisites." The
other forms ceased to be used, however, and in later revisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the practice of providing forms has
been discontinued. Prosecutors have come to depend largely upon
forms provided by a former justice of the Texas Court of Ap-
peals, "3 but it may be suggested that these. are unnecessarily long
and technical and are less effective than the shorter form to advise
the defendant of the offense with which he is charged.'
In other jurisdictions the use of the indictment has diminished
10 Id., § 11, form 20.
2 0 d., § 12.
21 Section 16 of the Act stated that "Matters of which judicial notice is taken
(among which are included the authority and duties of all officers elected or appointed
under the general laws of this State), and presumptions of law need not be stated in an
indictment;" this was substantially carried forward as article 411 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1925. For a comprehensive discussion of the Texas criminal
court system with reference to the use of indictments, see Carter, The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (1933) 11 Tex. L. REv. 301.
2 Gabrielsky v. State, 13 Tex. App. 428 (1883) (perjury) ; Allen v. State, 13 Tex.
App. 28 (1882) (aggravated assault) ; Brinster v. State, 12 Tex. App. 612 (1882)(rape) ; Rodriguez v. State, 12 Tex. App. 552 (1882) (burglary) ; Williams v. State,
12 Tex. App. 395 (1882) (theft).
23 WIL.SON, TEXAS CRIMINAL FoRMs (5th ed. 1930).
-4 For an analysis of some of the present problems of Texas criminal procedure in
which the author compares forms of indictment for the accusation of a few common
offenses prescribed by the English Indictment Act of 1915, the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of the American Law Institute, and the New Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, see Potts, New Rules of Criminal Procedure (1945) 23 TE:x. L. REv. 215.
[Vol. I
1947] WAIVER OF INDICTMENT
considerably" as it has become less necessary. The integration of
law enforcement agencies renders negligible the accusatory useful-
ness of the grand jury. Under modern practices, its function has so
largely come to be that of a rubber stamp for the prosecuting
attorney 6 that it is extremely seldom that a grand jury will initiate
any prosecution not presented to it by the prosecutor. For this
reason, it has been asserted by those favoring the alternative use
of the indictment or information in felony prosecutions that the
retention of the grand jury in such cases is an unjustifiable expense,
that it results in needless delay that is detrimental to the innocent
accused but welcomed by the guilty, and that it amounts to a use-
less duplication of the usual preliminary hearing.
The advantages secured by the alternative method of indictment
or information are several. The use of the information in criminal
prosecutions serves to place more squarely upon the prosecuting
attorney the responsibility for the just disposition of the case-a
responsibility which under the obligatory grand jury system is
'5 From recent correspondence with the various state supreme courts and attorneys-
general, it appears that the following states now permit the prosecution of indictable
offenses by informations (several states require indictments in the prosecution of capital
offenses, or where the punishment is imprisonment for more than ten years, or for other
specified crimes of the grade of felony): Arizona, Arkansas,* California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,' Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,* North Dakota, Okla.
homa, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. (* States that have adopted the
information system since the report of the American Law Institute in its CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) 40.)
The following ten states require felonies to be prosecuted upon indictment, but
permit the defendant to waive such indictment so that the information may be sub-
stituted: Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia.
26 See Dession, From Indictment To Ilnormation-Implications of the Shift (1932)
42 YALE L. J. 163, in which the author defends the retention of the grand-jury system
although acknowledging a marked shift from the use of the indictment to the informa-
tion.
27, Professor Raymond Moley has perhaps been the leading advocate of prosecution
by information in this country and has written extensively on the subject. In his articles
The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions By Indictment Or Information (1931) 29 Micn.
L. REv. 403, and The Use of the Information in Criminal Cases (1931) 17 A. B. A. J.
292, Professor Moley points out at length the deficiencies of the grand-jury indictment
as compared with the more flexible information.
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shared with the grand jury. 8 Moreover, the information may
unquestionably be used to effect a considerable saving of time."°
It dispenses with the necessity for holding the indigent prisoner in
jail for months awaiting a regular call of the grand jury. For the
innocent accused, the information system affords a prompt trial
and the discharge of any suspicion. For those who plead guilty, it
affords the opportunity of an immediate commencement of punish-
ment with a subsequent earlier release. It further denies to the
guilty defendant who is able to make bond the opportunity to
"contact" or "spirit away" the key witnesses.
The argument frequently advanced against the use of the infor-
mation that it places too much responsibility upon the prosecuting
attorney seems to overlook the fact that the actual filing of the in-
formation by the prosecuting attorney is merely ministerial in
nature.3" It is generally not the prosecuting attorney but the magis-
trate at the preliminary examination of the witnesses who deter-
mines the necessity for its filing."'
It is not questioned that in the past the reputations of many
citizens have been protected by the secrecy of the grand jury hear-
ings. However, under the present practice there are relatively few
cases in which the accused has not had an open preliminary hearing
at which he has been committed or released on bail."2 All too fre-
quently, newspaper accounts of the grand jury proceedings indicate
28 See Miller, Informations Or Indictments In Felony Cases (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV.
379, 396.
'19 Id. at 382. For a fuirther discussion of the arguments for and against the informa-
tion, see Note (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv. 615.
30 See Report of the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure (1934) 53 Ptoc.
TEx. BAft Asso. 160, 172.
31 In many jurisdictions permitting felony prosecutions by the use of informations,
there is provision for preliminary examination of witnesses by a magistrate who deter-
mines whether or not there is probable cause for believing the accused is guilty of the
offense charged. Where such probable cause is found to exist, the prosecutor files an





that the cloak of secrecy which is presumed to surround the grand
jury investigation, is somewhat less protective than has been
vehemently asserted.
Opponents of the abolition of the compulsory system of indict-
ment by the grand jury contend that it is desirable because of the
"independent" nature of the grand jury investigation." Impartial
surveys, however, indicate that only in rare instances do grand
juries initiate proceedings not formerly presented by the prose-
cuting attorney." This is necessarily so, since the grand jury is not
empowered to employ private investigators to secure information."
The use of the grand jury several hundred years ago as an inde-
pendent body to initiate prosecutions was undoubtedly sound.
Perhaps the grand jury is still of value as an independent investi-
gating body in some communities where crime is so occasional that
a breach of the peace is observed by most of the citizens. But no
twelve city-dwellers can be found who are able to add materially
to the investigation conducted by a large urban police force."'
However, it is not intended to be asserted that the grand jury in
Texas no longer serves an important function. The mere existence
of the grand jury as a symbol has a salutary effect upon the public
and law-enforcement officers alike. It is of particular importance
as a means of forcing the prosecution of corrupt political "bosses"
who occasionally control the public prosecutor. It is interesting to
33 See note 26 supra.
34 See note 27 supra.
35 For members of a grand jury to employ a private investigator to further their
efforts in securing evidence against the defendant has been sofficient cause for reversal
of the trial court's failure to quash the indictment since it is not within the scope of the
inquisitorial power of the grand jury to employ and finance private detectives to collect
evidence, and therefore the jurors were disqualified. People v. Kempley, 265 Pac. 310
(Cal. App. 1928), (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 761.
36 See Miller, Informations Or Indictments In Felony Cases (1924) 8 MuNN. L. REV.
379, 395.
ST Id. at 407.
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note, however, that in those jurisdictions providing for the alterna-
tive method of proceeding in felony cases, the grand jury has
practically disappeared." The frequency with which the grand
jury should be called, under such a view of its function, would
properly be within the trial court's discretion. But if the very real
advantages of limited use of the grand jury are to be preserved, a
statutory provision requiring that the grand jury be convened at
least once a year would seem to be necessary.
Proposals seeking to amend Article I, Section 10, of the Texas
Constitution, frequently urged by members of the Bar, have
repeatedly met with disfavor,"0 although it is well established that
the procedure proposed to be substituted violates no right guar.
anteed by the Federal Constitution." Other methods of reducing
the delay encountered in the present indictment system have been
proposed from time to time by Texas Bar Committees, e. g., the
maintaining of continuous terms for grand juries and the abolition
of continuances. Although the adoption of such proposals would
undoubtedly speed up the trial of felony prosecutions in districts
where the grand jury is now called infrequently, it would not serve
to reduce substantially the present objections of expense, lack of
efficiency, and division of responsibility between the grand jury
and the prosecutor.
38 See Dession, From Indictment To information - Implications of the Shift (1932)
42 YALE L. J. 163, 190.
8o See Report of the Committee On Criminal Law and Procedure (1934) 53 PROC.
TE.x. BAR Asso. 160; Report of the Committee On Criminal Procedure of the District
Judge's Asso. (1925) 3 Tax. L. REv. 166.
Because of the general disfavor accorded such recommendations for reform, various
members of the Bar have offered the alternative, but less progressive, recommendation
of continuous or successive grand-jury terms in an effort to reduce the delay incurred in
small counties occasioned by the present inadequate system. See Report of the Com-
mittee On Criminal Law and Procedure (1941) 61 PRoc. T.x. BAR Asso. 32; Report of
Committee On Remedial Procedure (1939) 58 Paoc. Tax. BAR Asso. 122.
40 United States v. Gill, 55 F. (2d) 399 (D. N. M. 1931).
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The new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 provide that
non-capital felony offenses may be prosecuted by information if,
after having been advised of the nature of the charges against him
and of his rights in the matter, the accused agrees in open court
to waive prosecution by indictment. 2 This procedure, whether
the accused is ready to plead guilty and commence serving his
sentence promptly or is anxious to have his innocence quickly
demonstrated, saves the cumbersome and frequent delay occa-
sioned by the necessity of grand jury action. Any doubts that may
have existed concerning the constitutionality of such a provision
were resolved by the decision in United States v. Gill."
It seems clear that a similar provision for the waiver of indict-
ment by a grand jury in non-capital felony offenses would not
violate Article I, Section 10, of the Texas Constitution."" In the
Gill case, the Court declared that the indictment was not essential
to confer jurisdiction on the court, but was merely a right of the
accused which he could waive." This procedure has been upheld
41 For a few of the leading articles discussing the NEw FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL'
PROCEDURE, see Vanderbilt, New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure (1943) 29 A. B.
A. J. 376 (also condensed in 6 TEx. BAR J. 300) ; Holtzoff, The New Federal Criminal
Procedure (1946) 37 J. CRaM. L. 111; Waite, The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (1943) 27 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 101; Robinson, The Proposed Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1943) 27 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 38; Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal
Procedural Revision (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 723; Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1943) 22 TEX. L. Ry.v. 37.
42 FED. RULES CRIM. PROC. (1946) Rule 7(b).
43 55 F. (2d) 399 (D. N. M. 1931). In this case the court, speaking through Circuit
Judge Phillips stated, at 403, "We are unable to find in the decisions any convincing
ground for holding that a waiver is effective in misdemeanor cases, but not effective in
the case of felonies."
43a TEx. CODE CalM. PROC. (1925) art. 11, as amended by Acts 1931, 42d Leg., p.
65, c. 43, § 2, provides: "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense, may
waive any right secured him by law except the right of a trial by jury in a felony case
when he enters a plea of not guilty." Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
declared that "one accused of a criminal oflense may waive any constitutional and
statutory right except that of trial by jury in a capital case." Simpson v. State, 141 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 324, 148 S. W. (2d) 852 (1941).
44 It has also been held that other constitutional rights may be waived by the de-
fendant; see, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 465 (1938) (right of cotmsel);
United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931) (privilege against self-incrimination)
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930) (trial by jury).
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in other states having similar constitutional prohibitions.'5
The adoption of a code provision or rule of procedure permitting
such waiver in non-capital felony cases would expedite greatly the
trial of numerous cases that would ordinarily be delayed pending
the calling or action of a grand jury. Moreover, such a provision
could be expected to reduce materially the expense in time and
salaries of all persons involved. Finally, there would be consid-
erably less difficulty in obtaining the presence of key witnesses at
the trial, were it known that such trial would be held at once.
The provision of the Federal Criminal Rules seems to have some
advantage over the provision adopted by the American Law Insti-
tute, whereunder the prosecutor is free to determine whether indict-
ment or information is to be employed.4 ' The former provision is
not subject to the objection which may be offered against the latter,
that the rights of the accused have been violated.' 7 Moreover, the
chief objection urged against the alternative method of proceeding
as proposed by the American Law Institute, that too much dis-
cretion is conferred upon the prosecuting attorney, would like-
wise be inapplicable to the Federal Rule. The discretion as to the
manner of proceeding under the federal practice whereby the
accused may waive the indictment, is vested in the accused. And
as a further precaution, the Federal Rule requires that the waiver
be made in open court, and only after the accused has had the
advice of counsel and has been informed of his rights."8
If a provision comparable to that of Federal Rule 7(b) were
adopted, the grand jury system itself would be preserved intact.
4'5Michigan has a still different procedure that avoids the necessity of a grand jury
to return indictments. A single district judge is invested with all of the inquisitorial
powers of a grand jury and his findings are given the effect of an ordinary indictment,
See Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury (1945) 28 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 137.
4, AMERICAN LAW INs'r[tuTr, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) § 113 provides
that "All offenses heretofore required to be presecuted by indictment may be prosecuted
either by indictment or by information."
47 See Mitchell, Reform In Federal Criminal Procedure (1932*) 18 A. B. A. J. 732;
Robinson, The Proposed Federal Rules oi Criminal Procedure (1943) 27 J. AM. Jun.
Soc. 38.
'
5 FED. RULES CRIM. PROC. (1946) Rule 7(a), (b).
[Vol. 1
1947] WAIVER OF I.VDICTAIENT 33
Moreover, the decrease in the number of cases scheduled to be
brought before the grand jury would reduce the length of its term
and render service thereon less objectionable to the average citizen.
Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that the number of
reversals based upon technical defects in indictments would be
materially reduced. In cases in which the accused waives indict-
ment and prosecution proceeds by the more flexible information,
amendments to the information could be made without the neces-
sity of recalling the grand jury to return a new indictment.
William E. Iolmson, Jr.
